

DCI SCHEDULING ITEM

79-256

DATE RECEIVED: 25 September 1979

DATE OF EVENT: Within next few weeks

1. INFORMATION REGARDING THE APPOINTMENT:

SUSPENSE: 2 October 1979

- a. Source: Tel: 393-6820 Ltr Fm: Ronald M. Bancroft
- b. Type of event: DCI meet w/team from McKinsey & Co.
- c. Special occasion: Discuss naval strategy (unclassified)
- d. Date/Time: Within next few weeks
- e. Location: Washington, D. C.
- f. Significant info:

2. SCHEDULE:

11-13 OCT 26-27 Oct

	<i>Not</i>	<i>Pittsburgh</i>				
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3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

	Schedule	Regret	Remarks
AIDE		<i>18</i>	<i>You have not the time required for preparation and discussion.</i>
EA			

4. DCI DECISION:

a. SCHEDULE _____ NO ☒ SEE ME _____

b. ADDITIONAL ATTENDEES _____

c. PASS TO: DDCI _____ D/DCI/IC _____ D/DCI/NI _____ OTHER _____

5. AIDE FINAL ACTION: *Regretted by Ltr Oct 28 Sep*

STAT

79-8438

McKinsey & Company, Inc.

1700 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 TELEPHONE 202-393-6820

September 21, 1979

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20501

Dear Admiral Turner:

I called you last week about a meeting to discuss naval strategy. Appreciating that in these days of SALT verification and Cuban troop dispositions you may be pressed, let me briefly expand on my call to your appointments secretary.

A team from McKinsey is currently working with the FMC Corporation, as you know the principal supplier of surface ship guns, to determine what FMC's future strategy should be in this apparently dwindling market. As part of this effort the team has assessed the U. S. and world market - from unclassified sources - and developed a preliminary presentation focusing principally on the implications of current U. S. naval strategy for the future gunnery market. They have discussed this scenario with several senior naval officers, including the CNO, and with members of the OSD and NSC staffs. They would also like to discuss this with you. The conversation would be unclassified and draw on your perspective as one both thoughtful and articulate on matters of naval strategy (rather than as one currently leading the CIA). If this could be arranged in the next few weeks, it would be a great help to us and, perhaps, of some interest to you.

While I have not been directly involved in this project, I have naturally been interested and have followed their progress closely. I think you would enjoy the discussion.

Yours sincerely,


Ronald M. Bancroft

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

28 September 1979

Dear Ron,

Sorry I'm so hard to get hold of and pin down. I did personally know of your phone call and regretfully asked my staff to decline the invitation. As I'm sure you know, it's just the kind of thing I enjoy doing.

The first reason I simply cannot put it on my schedule is that we are all up to our ears in SALT and Soviet brigades in Cuba at this time. I really cannot take on one more thing.

Beyond that, I have all I can do to keep abreast of my intelligence responsibilities and have found it necessary to forsake naval matters such as the question you are addressing. I haven't given much thought to such issues for some time.

In a capsule, however, my views on the future of the gunnery market are:

- There is a big future for point defense. We are woefully behind in developing it. We need higher velocity shells and a large volume of output.

- There is no need for the major caliber lightweight gun. We simply cannot afford to put enough of them on enough ships to do World War II type area bombardment in anticipation of an amphibious assault. We must have substantial naval air power on the scene to do any amphibious assault. It is going to have to take over the traditional role of suppression during the immediate period of an assault.

- As far as reaching long-range targets, the data on MCLWG has always shown that the probability of hitting a hard target at long range with that gun was so slight as to make it useless. Hence, it would be a crime to take space and weight on a combatant that is badly needed for point defense in particular and devote it to a purpose that cannot be fulfilled.

Other than those two prejudices and perhaps outmoded ideas, I doubt that I could contribute much to your symposium. In any event, I wish I could do it just for fun, but I really simply cannot take the time.

Hope we can get together some other way before too long. In the meantime, all the best.

Yours,



STANSFIELD TURNER

Mr. Ronald M. Bancroft
McKinsey & Company, Inc.
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006